MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.
OVERVIEW AND CONSIDERATIONS *
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This paper has been prepared for the International Workshop “Integrating Migration into Development: Diaspora as a Development Enabler,” Rome, 2-3 October 2014, organised by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) during the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

It aims at contributing to the debate on the relation between migration and international development, a pertinent and important topic. It draws on elements from the international and European debate and applies them to geopolitical contexts that are relevant for Europe and Italy. It discusses current population and migration dynamics and future forecasts, and outlines options for policy and development cooperation 1.

The following development and humanitarian NGOs are members of “LINK 2007 - Cooperazione in Rete”: CESVI, CISP, COOPI, COSV, MEDICI CON L’AFRICA-CUAMM, GVC, ICU, INTERSOS, LVIA.

I – INCOHERENT POLICIES IN AN INTERCONNECTED REALITY

Migration and mobility: growing structural phenomena

1. Extreme inequality is a characteristic of the contemporary world. Growing inequalities occur both between rich and poor countries and within both. When migration is at stake, the alarming data published in UNDP’s Human Development Report 2014 2 should be taken into account. On the one hand, the report reveals significant improvements for certain human development indicators, for instance those related also to Millennium Development Goals such as health and education. On the other hand, the gap between rich and poor is widening everywhere. Approximately 2.7 billion people, more than one third of the world population, live in poverty or in conditions of severe deprivation. Of these, 1.2 billion suffer from hunger, surviving on less than $ 1.25 a day (less than 1 Euro). The remaining 1.5 billion live, in 91 countries, in poverty conditions that expose them to severe failings in health care, education, standard of living (UNDP, multidimensional poverty index). Every five

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seconds, a child dies from malnutrition. In countries with illiteracy rates that reach 60-70%, compared to 3% in the West, 75 million children do not go to school.

2. While not fully representing the socio-economic situation in a country, data on yearly GDP per capita are extremely telling: $ 40,000 in the USA, $ 29,000 in Italy, $ 2,500 in Iraq, $ 1,700 in Syria, $ 860 in Pakistan, $ 600 in Burundi, $ 420 in Afghanistan. While the price of cereals (staple food for most of the world’s population) has increased by 70% in the last 10 years, rich countries continue subsidising their own farmers and sparingly offering support to agriculture in poorer countries. Here, the race to land grabbing is booming. Land is acquired both by states in search of solutions to their food problems, and by private corporations in pursuit of speculative aims, to the detriment of food production for local populations. The ratio between spending on armaments and spending on humanitarian aid and development cooperation is 10 to 1 (600 to 60 billion). Military expenditure worldwide amounts to one trillion dollars, against 325 billion spent on agriculture.

3. Disasters related to climate change, in particular drought and floods, affect more than 350 million people (106 million in 2012 alone), who are often forced to abandon their lands (currently 32.4 million, with forecasts of 200-250 million in 2050)3. More than 51.2 million people, often entire families, flee war, repression, persecution. They seek protection in their own country (33.3 million), or elsewhere (16.7 million refugees and 1.2 million asylum seekers)4.

4. While accounting for the size and entity of some of the conditions that lead to emigration, these data also challenge us. They uncover situations in which structural inequalities and vulnerabilities may become explosive, and that could be contained if only we invested in policies and initiatives. Less than 2% of the global GDP would suffice to ensure basic social protection for the poor worldwide (UNDP).

5. Migration has always existed. It is an inevitable and unstoppable phenomenon that can and must be adequately governed, by taking into account the reasons pushing people to emigrate. Alongside the economic, human and environmental factors just mentioned, population growth will represent a significant cross-cutting factor in the coming decades. Many industrialised countries, for instance in the EU, are characterised by aging societies. They face labour shortages that are compensated through migration. For the next two or three decades, the population in the rest of the world will continue to grow, with an expected increase from 7.2 billion in 2013 to 8.1 in 2025 and 9.6 billion in 2050. According to the latest UNDESA estimates, whilst it is anticipated that the population in poor countries will grow from 5.9 billion in 2013 to 8.2 billion in 2050, rich countries are expected to remain stable around 1.3 billion people5.

6. It should be added that current international mobility is also triggered by the aspirations of younger generations to travel, to discover other places, to open to the world in search of new opportunities for themselves and their families, to give new meanings to work and life. In the decades to come, this unstoppable trend will continue thanks to means such as education, increase of knowledge, global dissemination of information, ease of travel. Yet, we are not prepared for the arrival of such changes. Policy, in particular, remains obstinately absent-minded, especially in Italy, where we are accustomed to last-minute reactions once a situation has already evolved into an emergency.

Values, principles and global governance

7. Before further addressing the issue of migration flows, it is useful to briefly discuss universal values and principles, and global governance. These topics are not only high on the current agenda, but they are also closely linked, in our view, to migration. Our Western civilization has undoubtedly

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4 UNHCR, Global Trends 2013 report.
stimulated the diffusion and adoption of human rights and democratic participation, making the world a better place and opening it to modernity and progress. Principles such as human dignity, justice, fundamental and inalienable rights, including, first and foremost, the right to life, freedom from hunger and ignorance, and the right to protection, are at the core of such a civilisation, which is nonetheless also full of inconsistencies and contradictions. The latter are many and severe, yet we often prefer not to see them or simply to deny them, when applying those “universal” principles and values in the confined space of our own well-being and interests, in defence of our suspicions and fears, at times even adjusting legislation and international laws to respond to particular interests at particular times, covering and supporting dictatorships because they are politically useful. Changes should be introduced urgently, without waiting any longer, if we do not wish to passively sit back and watch our civilization gradually implode.

8. The continuous appeal to the military as a means to solve conflicts, which usually comes with no prospects of addressing also the political, economic, environmental and social factors at the origin of tensions, demonstrates the weakness and inadequateness of policy. It reveals the lack of a new vision that can move beyond the vision of the past centuries. In addition to causing suffering to people and detouring significant resources that could be devoted to fighting poverty, wars make the world more insecure and unstable; often, they feed the spiral of terrorism. We are not suggesting an a priori rejection of force, which may indeed be a necessary means of defence or international policing in pursuit of prevention, fight against threats, and peace preservation. What we do question, instead, are the ways in which force has been used particularly during the last decades. We denounce a general lack of political courage, combined with an arrogant view of the world on behalf of dominant Western states. These failed to seize the right moment and the political opportunities that followed the end of the Cold War. They did not put enough pressure onto the enactment of what they themselves had called for on 31.1.1992, during the first Security Council meeting on a par with Heads of State, and that Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali later elaborated in his report “An Agenda for Peace” with the aim of strengthening the United Nations’ (UN) capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.

9. That report was put aside. We wish to recall it here because we believe that policy failings and mistakes, particularly in the management of international crises, have been and continue to be a relevant factor for migration today. Released in June 1992, the report presented a number of specific recommendations to the General Assembly for the strengthening of the UN, the Council and the Secretary General’s powers. Among others, it recommended “the ready availability of armed forces on call” to give the Council “a means of response” against aggression and “of deterring breaches of the peace,” which could also act as a warning to infringers and tyrants. This opportunity was not seized. Member states proved unwilling to transfer to the UN spaces of sovereignty that might have allowed conflict and peace-keeping management to evolve differently compared to prevalent practice in the past decades, which has been chaotic, improvised and polluted by other purposes. The outcomes are before our eyes: destabilisation, destruction, suffering, and migration. Is the idea of resuming, updating and implementing the “Agenda for Peace” utopic? Can Italy play a role and push also Europe in such a direction?

10. Our world is complex and this complexity calls for decisions to be taken in order to ensure its governance. On the one hand technologies are currently available that could solve problems at the origin of tensions, such as poverty, hunger, and environmental degradation. On the other hand tools are available – from global and regional institutions to international law and treaties – that could also favor peace maintenance. A strong consensus among member States is required on the need to comply with international law and on the definition of concrete tools to ensure that it is fully implemented.

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This would be achieved if a global and authoritative institutional governance\textsuperscript{7} was recognised, equipped with the necessary powers and capable of building bridges, despite ongoing attempts to destroy them, of negotiating, of fostering collaboration and cooperation. The EU has included this issue in its proposed goals for the post-2015 Agenda,\textsuperscript{8} however there may still be a long way to go to achieve political will to concretely adopt international institutions and delegate actual powers to them to address global issues. Unfortunately, individual interests continue to prevail that are shaped by short-sighted and often erroneous visions. The tendency is also widespread to address international crises with the consent and participation of coalitions of the willing, or of individual member States, often moved by political opportunism. The absence of preventive assessments and decisions on behalf of a global body further weakens the scenario. The complexity of this reality raises fears and suspicions. There is an urgent need to identify ways of governance if we do not wish to be overwhelmed by geopolitical chaos and war, to which migration is often linked.

II – DIVERGENT INTERESTS OF MIGRANTS AND STATES

The ambiguities of Triple win scenarios and migrant interest

11. The publication of the report by the Secretary General of the UN General Assembly\textsuperscript{9} in 2006 marked an increase in global interest for the linkages between migration and development, and for opportunities to improve economic and social conditions in both countries of migrant origin and destination. Co-development is presented as offering triple win advantages: to migrants and to the two countries linked by their migration. This interpretation is shared by all international organisations and by the EU, who all believe that well managed migration can contribute to the human development of migrants and their families, host countries and countries of origin.

12. Triple win ideals are nonetheless rooted in different interests held by the three subjects at stake, who each have very different understandings of migration, mobility and return. For receiving countries, the win factor mainly corresponds to control over immigrant entry, availability of labour in line with market and welfare demand, contribution to the economy, taxation and consumption levels, and removal of unwanted immigrants. Policies in poor or emerging countries are guided by national development priorities; their main win factor is the reduction of unemployment through the outlet of emigration, while the advantages of return migration differ significantly from case to case, on the basis of the individual profile of migrants, regardless of whether they are permanent, temporary, circular or virtual migrants. The win factor for migrants is the opportunity to improve conditions for themselves and their families. These private aspirations prevail over those of countries of origin (aimed at national development) and over those of countries of residence (that see them as filling gaps in labour markets and contributing to the economy). These differences should be taken into account in discussions within governments and between institutions, civil society and migrant organisations\textsuperscript{10}.

13. The (semi-voluntary or forced) return of unwanted migrants remains a priority for the EU, which would like to understand return as permanent\textsuperscript{11}. Countries of origin, instead, aim at maximising

\textsuperscript{7} On this point, see: Jeffrey Sachs, L`auspicabile ritorno del Diritto Internazionale, Il Sole 24 Ore, 25.7.2014.
\textsuperscript{8} European Commission, A decent Life for all: from vision to collective action, COM (214) 335, Brussels, 2.6.2014.
\textsuperscript{9} International Migration and Development (A/60/871), 18.05.2006, Report by the Secretary General to the United Nations General Assembly.
\textsuperscript{10} Particularly enlightening in this respect is the article by Giulia Sinatti, Return migration as a win-win-win scenario? Vision of return among Senegalese migrants, the state of origin and receiving countries, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Routledge/Taylor & Francis, London. Published online ahead of print 27.1.2014: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013.868016.
remittances (that in some cases amount to 10-15% of GDP)\textsuperscript{12} and other benefits. They wish to remain connected with their diaspora and call for increased mobility that can better serve the interests of the country rather than the permanent return of its emigrants, with a concern for attracting the highly skilled segments of their overseas citizens. In exchange for bilateral agreements on controlled movement, fight against irregular migration, readmission and permanent return of deported or rejected migrants, since 2011 the EU has introduced the idea of mobility\textsuperscript{13} and not only offers development assistance to its partner countries, but it also facilitates visas for legal immigration. The Commission is promising further openness: removal of all unnecessary bureaucratic barriers to facilitate international labour mobility; 5-year multiple entry visas for persons who travel regularly to Europe; recognition of educational qualifications to promote migrant professionalism and prevent brain waste\textsuperscript{14}. Knowing that one-third of immigrants in OECD countries in 2013 held a university degree\textsuperscript{15} helps understand that brain waste is a missed development opportunity also for industrialised countries.

14. These small signals of increased coherence and change are however still very strongly centred around the interests of (origin and destination) states, and loosely connected to the migratory project of individuals and their families, which is what matters most to migrants. Despite these being positive measures that should indeed be implemented, the third side of the triple win cannot be limited to the recognition of qualifications, simplifying bureaucratic procedures and a few multiple-entry visas. Having left for economic reasons, immigrants work hard to improve living conditions for themselves and their loved ones. They think of return in the longer term, when they will be in a position to satisfy the welfare, housing, education, medical care, clothing, and other needs of their families. In these cases, return may close the migration cycle and satisfy the aspiration for final resettlement back home. Here, migrants may wish to retire, or they may invest in small enterprises, setting up businesses in the transport, agriculture, livestock, and other sectors, which do not always correspond to governmental aspirations for large-scale investments.

15. Return visits, even prolonged ones, should be facilitated. They often lead to the repatriation of savings that stimulate local expenditure and investment in new businesses. They should be understood as “business trips.” For migrants to invest in their own country, they must be able to upkeep strong relations by regularly traveling back from the country of residence, where they continue to work, acquire skills, purchase goods for their businesses in the context of origin, maybe import other goods, and establish business relationships. Migrants’ mobility (before and after return) is often the key condition that determines the repercussions of their efforts on economic development and that makes return sustainable. This contrasts with the focus on permanent return that prevails at the level of the EU and its Member States (even when mitigated by a “let us help them at home” approach). Recent research shows that the inability to freely control the timing of their own return has negative repercussions on migrants’ ability to accumulate the resources needed for investment, as the case of Senegal and other West African countries demonstrates\textsuperscript{16}.

\textsuperscript{12} According to Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on International Migration and Development, Peter Sutherland (New York, April 2014), remittances towards developing countries reach the amount of 400 billion US dollars every year. This figure is three times that of global overseas development assistance, which in 2013 was approximately 135 billion US dollars.


\textsuperscript{14} Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, at the Global Forum on Migration and Development, Stockholm, 15.5.2014.

\textsuperscript{15} A. Ricci, Popolazione, sviluppo e migrazioni a livello mondiale, Dossier Statistico Immigrazione, IDOS, 2014

III – IN SEARCH OF EMPLOYMENT, PROTECTION AND BETTER LIVING CONDITIONS

Demographic trends and the need for new job opportunities

16. There are currently 232 million international migrants globally, approximately 3% of the world population: 57 million more than in 2000. The number of migrant workers has doubled during the first decade of this century compared to the previous decade, and the majority is represented by young people aged 20-35 years. Countries of the global North currently host approximately 51% of all migrants. In terms of flows, however, South-North migration has decreased in recent years as a result of the crisis, whereas South-South migration has increased. Between 2000 and 2013, South-South movement accounted for 57% of all migration flows\textsuperscript{17}, and as many as 9 out of 10 refugees live in countries of the global South\textsuperscript{18}. They flee war and persecution (for instance the millions of Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, the large flows of people within West Africa or the Horn of Africa, Palestinians in Jordan, Syrians in neighboring countries, populations recently admitted to Iraqi Kurdistan). They also flee poverty, in search for better economic opportunities (such as the 3 million Bangladeshis in India or the hundreds of thousands of Southern and West Africans in South Africa). Despite the significant extent of South-South migration – which puts into perspective appeals against the “invasion” on behalf of some of our own political circles and media – our analysis focuses mainly on South-North contexts, which are more relevant for European countries and Italy.

17. Africa, the closest continent to us, has a population that will have grown from 1.1 billion people to 2.4 billion by 2050. Nigeria, with an expected 440 million people against 173 in 2013, will be the third most populated country in the world, surpassing the United States; Ethiopia will reach 188 million; taken together, Congo, Tanzania and Egypt will be over 400 million. As a term of comparison: the EU currently has a population of 603 million inhabitants, the USA 320 million. Half of world’s population growth will be in Africa. The ten youngest countries in the world will be in Africa, with an average age of approximately 20 years (29-30 is the world average, 43 the EU average). In Europe, which is below the rates needed for full demographic renewal, a population decline is expected of approximately 90 million by 2050. Alongside population aging, this will lead to a shortage of 48 million workers. Improvements in life expectancy will increase the number of people over 65 years. This will be the trend everywhere, but especially in the European Union, where the current ratio of 9 economically active people per elderly will narrow down to 4 to 1 in 2050.

18. These estimates were released in 2013 by the UN in the \textit{World Population Prospect}\textsuperscript{19} and have recently been confirmed by UNICEF, which indicates that in 2050 Africa will be home to 41% of births worldwide, 25% of the world population (against 16% currently), and 37% of boys and girls under 18 years\textsuperscript{20}. Some scholars, including Italian ones, criticise the United Nations for drawing up excessively long-term and static projections that are based on assumed constant drivers of change. This leads non-expert audiences of their reports to believe that the most likely future scenario is that in 2100 there will be 11 billion people (against 7 billion today), half of which will be in Africa. These critiques are solid. Demographic projections should not go beyond two or three decades, given the multiple nature of factors of change in the near future. For instance, rapidly changing social, cultural and economic rights in poor countries today will mitigate population growth, and shrinking

\textsuperscript{17} Data from the speech by the ILO General Director Guy Ryder: \textit{Fair Migration, Setting an ILO agenda}, International Labour Conference, Geneva, 2014.

\textsuperscript{18} A. Ricci, \textit{Popolazione, sviluppo e migrazioni a livello mondiale} (id.)


\textsuperscript{20} UNICEF, Division of Data, Research and Policy, Generation 2030/Africa – Child Demographics in Africa, Report, August 2014.
populations in rich countries are already compensated by immigration, which leads over the years to settlement and produces less alarming demographic forecasts\textsuperscript{21}.

19. Our analysis is therefore limited to projections that do not go beyond 2050. If we still wanted to be particularly cautious and reduce estimates by one quarter, Africa is still confirmed to play a central role in the distribution of the world population during the current century. However solid, the critiques coming from scholars are nevertheless not reassuring. Disruptions will come: demographic disruptions will add to ongoing disruptions in the economy, geopolitics and international relations. These disruptions must not be underestimated. Instead, we must prepare ourselves to cope with them, improve our capacity to govern them, learn to reap the opportunities that may come along with them at the right moment, before they overwhelm us. The data above show that the needs of Europe and Africa are already complementary. They call for better understanding if we wish to reap all possible benefits and control critical aspects. Instead, crude and misleading political propaganda refuses the truth and prevents from looking at reality to understand it, deal with it and govern it while we are still in time to do so.

20. By 2050, Africa may have doubled its economically active population (between 14 and 65 years), housing an estimated reservoir of 700 million people in working age. Despite economic growth, equal on average to 5-6\% of GDP per year, and despite a corresponding increase in employment, the vast majority of these people will be in search of an occupation. Some of them will be desperate to find a job, or to find more stable and qualified employment in countries that remain characterised by large pockets of poverty and in which people live with approximately one euro a day. Africa must provide extensive new job opportunities. If it fails in this, the migration of tens, maybe hundreds of millions of people towards economically stronger African countries or towards Europe will be inevitable.

**Promote the development of business and work**

21. Creating jobs in Africa is a priority, to which development cooperation can bring a substantial contribution. Solidarity and giving, however, must be coupled with an entrepreneurial dimension through public and private investment. This will promote business creation, employment, and widespread development that are respectful of the right to ownership of land and property of local farmers and producers and of their associations. Investments must be responsible and sustainable, both economically and ecologically. They may focus on the agricultural and food sector, infrastructure, energy, manufacturing, technology, tourism, handicraft, transport, wise use of water, soil improvement, etc., in line with the priorities set by each country. Particular attention must be paid to micro and small-to-medium-sized enterprises, the establishment of cooperatives, the social economy, peer-to-peer lending. The new Italian law on development cooperation goes in this direction. It acknowledges and values non-profit and profit, national and local, private and public actors\textsuperscript{22} who together can contribute to the fight against poverty and the promotion of development, establishing strong and lasting partnerships and cooperating in relevant areas.

22. Enterprises, especially cooperatives, generate jobs. They must increase their commitment towards social responsibility, balancing economic goals with social and environmental ones, as established by the new law. It is in the European and Italian private sector’s own interest to address this challenge and take part, in the coming decades, in an ambitious plan of development and cooperation with Africa that will be mutually beneficial, enhancing the private sector and local markets, generating employment and reducing poverty. Cooperation should be based on partnership,


\textsuperscript{22} Law 125/2014, section VI, art. 23 and subsequent ones.
mutual interest, reciprocity, co-development, and must comply with environmental, social, and fiscal norms, human and labour rights. The role of regional authorities, universities, NGOs and civil society organisations that are already active in development cooperation, as well as the role of new actors recognised by the law – e.g. migrant associations, social cooperatives, fair trade associations, micro-finance and credit – can be better valued. NGOs and migrant associations in particular can contribute their knowledge, skills, experience and well-established relations in many parts of the African continent.

23. The European Commission recently published a Communication on “a stronger role of the private sector in achieving inclusive and sustainable growth in developing countries.” This offers a good starting point and an opportunity, providing the principles of development cooperation are followed and the goal of combating poverty is pursued. These lines, however, are not yet consistently linked with European and member state policies in the field of migration, asylum and mobility. The EU will have to fill this void to move beyond the incoherence that has characterised its policy on these issues in recent years.

IV - THE (STATE-CENTRIC) DEBATE ON MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The international vision

24. At the international level, an extensive debate is ongoing on the linkages between migration and development and on the role of immigrants/emigrants (depending on whether they are looked at from the perspective of countries of arrival or departure). Several conferences and working groups at the global and regional level have brought together extensive efforts. In our view, however, they have not yet yielded the expected results. This is partly due to the specific character of the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (which produces important declarations and resolutions that are necessarily limited to expressing ambitions, invitations, confirmations, convictions, recommendations) and of dedicated Fora, including the Global Forum on Migration and Development that was wanted by the General Assembly in 2006 (which is informal, voluntary, non-binding, does not have a Secretariat and is outside the UN system, although the two are tied together by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General on international migration and development). Gibril Faal, Chairman of Afford and civil society delegate at the informal hearings (New York, 07.15.2013) that took place ahead of the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, spoke about consultation fatigue and pointed out that over the years obvious claims are being made, which are not followed by a firm commitment to implement them.

25. The international debate, in fact, has defined and accepted some ideas, which are recalled in the documents of several institutions. To be brief, we illustrate the eight points of the Agenda for Action contained in the Report of the Secretary General “International Migration and Development” to the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly and to the High Level Dialogue of October 2013. These points have been recalled and further elaborated in various speeches and

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24 The UN High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development of the UN General Assembly has held two meetings: 14-15 September 2006 (61st session of the General Assembly) and 3-4 October 2013 (68th session). See the resolution adopted on 3.10.2013, A/RES/68/4.

25 In particular, the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), a platform for informal global dialogue on policies and practices in the field of migration and related areas, to favour synergy and exchange of information. Also noteworthy are the many informal meetings: high level dialogues, auditions, briefings, regional events, preparatory consultations ahead of the UN High-level Dialogues and Global Fora.

documents, including by the Global Migration Group (GMG)\textsuperscript{27} and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM),\textsuperscript{28} that are also the result of joint work with Member States, UN agencies and civil society organisations.

26. The eight points of the \textit{Agenda for Action} call on States to: 1) apply international conventions on the protection and promotion of fundamental economic, social and cultural rights of migrants, with particular attention to the most vulnerable, minors and their education, the fight against discrimination; 2) support labour migration, in particular by reducing remittance costs, controlling the costs of brokers, recognising qualifications and diplomas, ensuring the portability of social security; 3) eliminate all forms of exploitation and trafficking of workers and all other human beings; 4) help migrants in distress due to humanitarian crisis in their own countries or in countries of transit; 5) act to change public perceptions of migration and anti-immigrant sentiments, fighting all forms of xenophobia and involving educational institutions, the private sector, trade unions, the media and migrants themselves; 6) include migration in the post-2015 agenda and in development and cooperation programmes; 7) invest in knowledge and data collection for the definition of well-informed migration policies and monitor specific indicators measuring the degree of migrants’ protection and violations of their rights; 8) ensure policy coherence and define partnerships, nationally and internationally, involving various stakeholders to define policies for the protection and promotion of migrants. This paper is presented on the same day as the \textit{Giornata della memoria}, the Remembrance Day commemorating victims of migration in the Mediterranean Sea (to which we could add those in the Gulf of Aden and other seas). We therefore invite to share the appeal of “Comitato 3 Ottobre,” which calls us all to understand migration and adopt a human approach to migrant reception and integration\textsuperscript{29}, along the same lines as the eight-point \textit{Agenda for Action}.

27. The importance of these documents is undeniable. They articulate clear principles and lines of action. Nonetheless, slow progress and complications in their implementation are disappointing. Moreover, it is still difficult to concretely identify the specific role that migrants can play in development besides what they are already doing independently through remittances and their own initiatives. We adhere to the words of William Lacy Swing, IOM Director General, who says: “Migration is integral to development but not a substitute for it, [...] migrants can be agents of development but ought not to be held accountable for it.” We must be careful not to delegate to migrants responsibilities that belong to states.

28. The IOM is currently the main referent for migration. It would therefore be the most suitable organisation to take decisions and give answers that the world system is not yet able to provide. Nonetheless, it is not part of the United Nations system. It has the status of an intergovernmental organisation, not of a Programme, Fund, or special Agency of the UN. Perhaps for this reason it has not always been as effective as the issue of migration and its problematic nature require. The establishment of an organisation for migration within the UN system has been delayed. An inter-institutional group such as the GMG and global and regional Fora have been deemed sufficient to develop and coordinate lines and strategies of intervention. The UN take the shape that states want them to take, and too often states tend to favor the establishment of spaces that do not excessively restrict their own freedom of action. In this regard, ongoing discussions about reforming the UN are not reassuring. In our view, any such reform must not be limited to the exclusive composition of the

\textsuperscript{27} UN High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, 3-4 October 2013: \textit{Statement} by the Global Migration Group and \textit{GMG Position Paper}. The GMG, Global Migration Group, is a high-level inter-institutional group established in 2006 to improve international coordination. It is made up of UN Agencies/Organisations involved in activities related to migration, the WB and the IOM. It has three Working Groups and two Task Forces.

\textsuperscript{28} UN High Level Dialogue … (id.): \textit{Remarks}, William Lacy Swing, IOM Director General and \textit{IOM Position Paper}. Founded in 1951, the IOM is the main Intergovernmental Organisation active in the migration field, with 156 Member States and 10 observer States. 460 offices worldwide, 6,690 operational staff and more than 2,000 active projects.

\textsuperscript{29} http://www.comitatotreottobre.it.
Security Council. We are all well aware – as we have stated above and reiterate again here – that there is a strong need for a worldwide Organisation with recognised governance powers on global issues such as migration, human rights, security, the environment, peace, to name just a few, that require abandoning the current state-centric and self-centred conception of global issues.

The vision of the European Union

29. The European Commission admits that it has addressed the migration-development nexus by limiting its focus primarily on remittances, diaspora, brain drain, and circular migration. Moreover, it has mainly concentrated on a South-North rather than a South-South perspective on migration, despite the latter being quantitatively more significant. In its latest policy lines, however, a broader view is adopted and this was also presented at the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2013. Migration and mobility are defined positive factors for development; the fundamental rights of the person are recognised irrespective of a migrant’s status; respect for the rights of migrants and refugees is considered a “key component” of EU policies and of its actions to promote integration and fight discrimination, exploitation, human trafficking, racism and xenophobia. In order to maximise the development potential of (well managed) migration and mobility, the EU intends to incorporate them into its policies and strategies for human development. In co-operation activities, this is expected to encourage ownership, sustainability, and consistency in both bilateral and regional contexts, with the awareness that the focus must be expanded also to migration and development in South-South contexts. Policy coherence in individual countries, at the European and multilateral level, and a better coordinated and integrated approach have become basic requirements for the EU.

30. This perspective is appropriate, since any attempt to promote migrants’ role in development (in their dual position as immigrants here, and emigrants of their own countries) cannot do without giving them respect, acceptance, rights, integration, decent work, political and humanitarian assistance, protection and social security. Reference to policy coherence is also essential. Engaging in development cooperation must also mean encouraging inclusion, integration, sense of citizenship and community belonging. Hidden apartheid, lack of respect, humiliation, contempt based on racial, ethnic or religious grounds, rejection, and exclusion turn the fight against poverty into fight against the poor. They trigger reactions and resentment among migrants that can be easily used and accentuated by those who spread hatred and division.

31. Consistency is too often only mentioned. It requires complementarity between development cooperation policies, interventions in countries of origin and transit, immigration policy and foreign policy. In the many documents and regulations, the European Union and its Member States remain primarily concerned with controlling entry. They understand migration as a response to labour market needs and forget that, for migrants, it is in fact a much broader migration project. The EU is moving towards greater policy coherence: there are documents testifying this, and this is good. However this positive change is taking steps that are too small and too slow with respect to change and to needs that are in constant transformation, increasingly complex and difficult to address in standardised ways. Under these conditions, the goal of creating a comprehensive partnership with countries of origin and

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31 Under the single title “Free circulation of people, asylum and immigration” more than one hundred items can be counted. They include: freedom of movement, Shengen information system, crossing of external borders, visas, asylum regimes, “essential” harmonisation of national legislation, relations with third countries, immigration policies, entry and residence, irregular migration, return and deportation, information and cooperation between countries, etc.

transit to encourage synergy between migration and development, as was decided fifteen years ago by the European Council in Tampere in 1999, becomes harder to achieve.  

32. A case in point is the recent Declaration on Migration and Mobility at the fourth EU-Africa Summit, which was attended by 80 Heads of State and Government and African and European leaders. It reflects Europe’s first priority as tackling irregular migration, rather than solving Africa’s structural problems. As if the problem of irregular migration became relevant only from the border and did not require further attention for the African perspective and the perspective of migrants themselves. Europe emerges as increasingly moved by contradictory and shifting interests, rather than by the long-lasting values on which it was originally founded. Those values and principles are indeed solemnly recalled; however it is interests that are concretely exercised. Many recent confirmations of this trend can be evoked. Even *Mare Nostrum*, i.e. the saving of lives, will return to be *Frontex*, i.e. border control and return. There is no vision beyond the EU’s own boundaries; the EU does not feel any responsibility for the thousands of deaths at sea; it does not even feel the need to rethink the failure of its Mediterranean policy. How will the EU take part in future humanitarian interventions in aid of endangered populations around the world, when it is guilty of such inhumanity? It is normal that every country should take measures to regulate migration flows and ensure that they are aligned with its own economic and social situation. These measures, however, must be part of a farsighted vision that looks at social, political and demographic changes at the global level, at situations that periodically cause forced displacement, at opportunities that may emerge from relations with countries of migrant origin, and at respect for human rights and dignity of the person.

33. A common migration policy, defined in partnership with countries of origin and transit and inspired by a long-term strategy that takes into account economic and demographic dynamics globally and in particular in Africa, is urgently needed also to define lines of action for development cooperation. Some time ago, it was suggested to establish a European Agency for migration and mobility. It would be useful to resume and implement this proposal, however not simply reducing it uniquely to border control and defence by way of tools voluntarily made available by member states, as has been the case with Frontex. EuropeAid, the Directorate General for International Cooperation, could coordinate with such an Agency to promote shared integrated actions, enhancing the consistency and effectiveness of development cooperation actions and actions for decent migration governance.

**A focus on Italy**

34. The new Italian law on international development cooperation, no. 125/2014, which was passed by the Parliament in August 2014, contains explicit references to migrants and migration policies. “By promoting local development, including through the role of migrant communities and their relations with countries of origin, Italian cooperation policy contributes to shared migration policies with partner countries that are inspired by the protection of human rights and respect of European and international standards” (art. 2, s. 6). Development cooperation actors are defined as “organisations and associations of migrant communities that engage directly in relations of cooperation and development assistance with communities in countries of origin, or that collaborate with entities that meet the requirements referred to in this Article and are active in the countries concerned” (art. 26, s. 2, d). This novelty should not be underestimated, because it recognises and values the role of migrants in the development process in countries of origin, and it integrates their organisations as fully-fledged subjects within Italian international cooperation.

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34 Fourth EU-Africa Summit, 2-3 April 2014, Brussels, EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Mobility.
35 Outcome of the meeting between the Minister of Home Affairs, Angelino Alfano and the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, Brussels, 27.8.2014.
36 Law 11 August 2014, nr. 125, Disciplina generale sulla cooperazione internazionale per lo sviluppo.
35. The law is rooted in a vision of shared migration policies inspired by international and European norms. The latter lay down rights, protections and guarantees. Nonetheless, they suffer from a major weakness, as actions are not always consistent with them. This is evident, for instance, in the priority given to measures and agreements for the control of entry and for the readmission of undesired or rejected migrants in countries of origin. The law is nonetheless still open and innovative both in its spirit and in its understanding of development cooperation, which is no longer seen as unidirectional assistance, but rather as joint effort, partnership, common good, mutual interest and benefit. Another innovative element is the repeated need for coherence between public policies and development aims: migration policies and development cooperation policies must not only be connected, but they need to be coherently integrated on the basis of the principles and objectives set out in the first articles. The acknowledgement of the cooperation system as made up of public and private actors, non-profit and profit organisations (art. 23), the principle of inter-institutional confrontation (art. 16), and the principle of three-yearly intervention planning (art. 12) will help promote greater rationality and synergies, and less fragmented interventions. The new law thus opens new opportunities for action that can better respond to current challenges.

V – INTEGRATING MIGRATION IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Migrants’ role into development

36. When interrogating what role migrants can play in the development of their countries of origin, it is useful to start from what is already happening. Migrants, in fact, act without waiting for uncertain international or governmental decisions. Reality is very different from the way in which it is commonly represented. Economic reports are available that document the economic value of migration. They highlight that, even in times of crisis, immigrants are an asset to Italy and contribute to the gross national income by almost 5%, with 70 billion EUR. They head 7.8% of the total number of registered enterprises in Italy. Thanks to remittances and other resources transferred to their families back home, they alleviate poverty. They often start up economic activities that enhance local business and jobs. Thanks to the knowledge and skills they have acquired, they foster innovation, strengthen awareness of human and social rights and participation. They contribute to overcoming vulnerability and increasing resilience, i.e. the ability to withstand economic and environmental crisis. In short, migrants are already true development actors. For instance those who, after years of forced exile and international protection, return to rebuild their country after war or persecution, setting up businesses or taking up civil servant positions. The broader discourse of migrants as actors within policies and programmes for development cooperation initiated in their countries of residence and implemented with their countries of origin, in line with the principles of co-development, is in our opinion still insufficiently explored.

37. We believe that a reductive definition of co-development has emerged in recent years in Italy that is essentially limited to considering migrants as protagonists of their own development through

37 In particular articles 11, c. 3; 12, c. 4; 15, c. 1, c. 3; 16, c. 2; 20, c. 2; discussing the delegate Vice-minister, the annual activity report, the inter-ministerial Committee for development cooperation, the National Consultative Council, the Directorate General for development cooperation.

38 Rapporto Immigrazione e Imprenditoria 2014, Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS, June 2014. Fondazione Leone Moressa, Rapporto annuale sull’economia dell’immigrazione. 2012 edition: Immigrati, una risorsa in tempo di crisi; 2013 edition: Tra percorsi migratori e comportamento economico, Il Mulino. See also official statistics on migrant-headed entreprises from the Registro delle Imprese, quarterly made available by Unioncamere on the basis of Movimprese data (a survey realised by InfoCamere, the IT branch of the Italian Chambers of Commerce).

39 Migration flows as a development factor are among the topics chosen by Italy during its Presidency of the Council of the European Union (July-December 2014). On this issue, see: G. Cantini, Migrazioni e sviluppo: un tema per la Presidenza italiana e per l’Agenda post 2015, in Libertàcivili, November-December 2013, p. 7.
good integration in the societies in which they reside, and of the development of their communities of origin through NGO-like projects. According to this definition, concrete “co-development” initiatives have emerged involving immigrant associations, their economic and social integration and the proximity of other actors, such as regional and municipal authorities. Some of these initiatives involving diaspora groups were coordinated by the IOM, which in 2001 launched the MIDA strategy, Migration for Development in Africa. *Cooperazione Italiana* of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported its programmes in Ghana and Senegal, and most recently in Somalia. The case of the Senegalese diaspora in Milan, Paris and Geneva is an interesting example of transnational dynamics and many more examples come from other European countries. These initiatives are based on a positive approach that has been pioneered by some regional and local authorities with significant results. We believe, however, that these efforts are still too limited and circumscribed.

38. A significant step forward, at least in the underlying philosophy and aims, has been made in the framework of cooperation between Italy and Senegal: the PLASEPRI programme, a Platform supporting the private sector and enhancing the Senegalese diaspora in Italy. With concessional loans, non-repayable grants, contributions from the Government of Senegal, credit lines for SMEs and local non-speculative microfinance intermediaries for an overall value of approximately € 24 million, local authorities in the two countries and Senegalese associations and institutions in Italy play a leading role in the programme. The new development cooperation law 125/2014 confirms this approach, whilst also allowing further opening. It suggests a broader and more interesting form of co-development that starts from territorial partnerships (art. 9), which replace the former concept of decentralised cooperation. It is therefore useful to evaluate this recent experience and draw lessons from it.

**Strengths and weaknesses of current practice**

39. Local realities are the appropriate level of intervention: the cities and regions in which migrant communities reside and their associations operate. At the local level, some of them are organised and established, they have relationships with institutions and other organisations, they work, they have invested in families and interests, while still maintaining ties with their places of origin, also through regular return visits. At the local level it is also easier to identify and define specific interests on the basis of which public and private actors can build mutually beneficial collaboration between the two countries: this is the core of co-development.

40. The motivation of diaspora groups is a fundamental element for this type of cooperation to be initiated and become successful. Cooperation, in fact, must not be based on the initiative of individual migrants moved by private and family interests, but on collaboration between territories that involves immigrant communities at large (or those sections of migrant communities that have genuine interest,  

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40 The document “Ruolo delle diaspore e comunità migranti nella cooperazione: oltre le rimesse”, prepared by Gruppo 8 ahead of the International Development Forum (Milan, 1-2.10.2012) defines co-development as follows: According to the most common interpretation, [co-development] corresponds to the enrichment of the economies in countries of migrant origin thanks to the savings and skills acquired abroad by return migrants. Currently, however, it is recognised as a development cooperation model, in which migrants are seen as actors who transform their societies of origin and as dynamic players in the process of integration into host societies. Co-development therefore has threefold implications for migrants, origin and host societies: proactive and supportive integration, facilitation of cooperation linkages with areas of origin, promotion of awareness within host societies about the root causes of migration.  

41 In particular, see A. Stocchiero, *Iniziative di partenariato per il co-sviluppo. Progetto MIDA Ghana-Senegal*, Cespi, 2006.  


44 [http://www.dakar.cooperazione.esteri.it/utldakar/IT/plasepri/intro.htm](http://www.dakar.cooperazione.esteri.it/utldakar/IT/plasepri/intro.htm)  

45 This section develops some of the ideas presented in: N. Sergi, M. Rotelli, *Cooperazione allo sviluppo e immigrazione. Il valore delle diaspore*. Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2013, IDOS, p. 31. For further examples of interventions, see the original publication.
motivation and commitment) as well as other actors with an interest for the two localities connected by migration.

41. **Co-development and integration.** Experience highlights the importance of aligning integration and co-development policies. In some municipalities and regions that engaged in international cooperation initiatives together with migrants, the authorities involved felt the need to consult civil society representatives and jointly define their mutual areas of expertise. Connections, synergies and policies were identified, as a basis for coherent implementation. As a precondition, in fact, co-development requires a sufficient degree of inclusion and integration of migrants and their associations. Good integration facilitates access to the resources and capabilities needed to be development actors both here and in countries of origin. At the same time, co-development also promotes integration, strengthening and improving it within different societies and between societies of origin and residence.

42. **Migrants as development actors.** The lack of a national government policy means that the concept of co-development has been mainly explored by NGOs, other civil society actors, business associations, and local and regional authorities. Initiatives promoted at the local level have aimed at: engaging diasporas in interventions in their places of origin in the social, health, economic, educational, agricultural, water, infrastructure, and tourism field; creating the conditions for income-generating activities and small businesses; providing training and support both here and in places of origin; involving banks and financial institutions to promote the channeling of remittances towards virtuous purposes. The support that some countries of origin provide to migrant engagement should also be highlighted. Particularly noteworthy are efforts to promote the establishment of transnational corporations, with concrete governmental initiatives providing guidance, funding and assistance.

43. **The role of local public authorities.** This role is undoubtedly that of promoting and linking various local actors and authorities in partner countries. There is a need for local authorities to assess their interest for such a policy, which requires long-term investment and brings benefits to their own territory as well as to those of migrant origin. Recent “decentralised” cooperation experiences have revealed some limitations and inadequacies on behalf of local partner authorities in both countries. Some interventions were initiated without a real understanding of needs and without adequate monitoring and evaluation of results. This led to random interventions taking place outside co-development or any other verifiable programme, and therefore with limited guarantee of continuity. It is the responsibility of local authorities to develop and sustain relationships with authorities in partner countries, encourage the plurality of existing local actors, link migration and integration policies with co-development policies. It is not a question of defining a “project” (this is one of the current limitations), but rather of building a long-term and ongoing bilateral “process”: jointly designing a set of relationships and activities that respond, in a consistent way, to identified interests and mutually beneficial criteria.

44. **Co-development policies and regulations.** We already mentioned above the need to align immigration and international development cooperation policies. The new Italian law has opened up some opportunities, which however now need to be translated in practice. Unfortunately, signals prevail that contradict the openness and efforts to strengthen the nexus between migration and development. These include the low esteem for countries that migrants originate from, the still not very positive representation of immigration, and difficulties in reception and integration, including in the recognition of migrants’ rights. Linkages between migration and development must rely on plural and positive relations with countries of origin (some of which are just on the other side of the Mediterranean), on migrants’ active integration, on the recognition of their skills and abilities, on the exploitation of their transnational connections. Closure, even if only psychological, prevents exploiting the opportunities that may arise; it prevents grasping the innovative power that naturally accompanies immigrant presence, as has happened in other countries such as the United States.
Choices of the next generations are also affected, while they watch the best migrants choose to go elsewhere, to the Northern and Central Europe, whilst the remaining stay in Italy. This calls for a gradual deepening and revisitation of regulations in the field of integration, as well as for the recognition of educational qualifications and skill enhancement, circular migration, return migration followed by new legal entry in Italy, relationship with migrant associations, citizenship rights.

**From development assistance to co-development cooperation**

45. It is migrants’ transnationalism that should be further enhanced, particularly among those who are deeply rooted in Italian society and have shown interest for developing their countries of origin. The great added value lies in their ability to be, live and feel rooted both here and there (which is currently favoured by possibilities made available by information and communication technologies). Globalisation should be conceived primarily as multilocalism, on a human scale, based on the conscious and harmonious adoption of multiple identities. In this respect, migrants anticipate trends that will characterise the next generations of our own society, who will experience globalisation both by defending their individuality and by maintaining links with multiple interacting sites.

46. Taking this transnational and multi-local dimension and the leadership shown by some migrants in the initiation of transnational partnerships as starting points, co-development should be understood in a much broader sense. As noted above, it should be open to the local dimensions at both ends of the migration trail, involving potentially committed actors. Migrants’ transnationalism should offer opportunities to establish a transnationalism of Localities. The initiatives and projects promoted by migrants and their associations in countries of origin must be supported by broader initiatives by the localities in which they reside. These should enhance their transnationalism and build partnerships with localities of migrant origin, in all areas of mutual interest: social, cultural, economic, commercial, and institutional. For instance, if a Moroccan (or Senegalese, Egyptian, Nigerian, or other) community has a strong and well established presence in a given region and, over the years, has maintained relations with the region of origin, the development of extensive cooperation between the two regions, here and there, is not only possible but also a mutual opportunity.

47. Ten-year framework cooperation agreements (long-term, to be effective) could be signed between the two regional institutions. Regional agreements should in turn encourage and support other specific cooperation agreements, not only between immigrants and resident communities of origin but also between NGOs, universities, cooperatives, enterprises and enterprise associations, banks, social actors, etc. This would be the basis for a true and lasting co-development, rooted in the principles and ethics of development cooperation, partnership, equal dignity, human rights, justice, and mutual advantage.

48. These are not so difficult things to aspire to, yet it is necessary to want them. Official national and European development assistance institutions are essential to initiate such co-development initiatives between regions linked by emigrants/immigrants. In the economic sphere, the best way forward seems providing contributions that will encourage enterprise creation, with the aim, over time, of making them economically sustainable and self-sufficient without further financial contributions. Also in other sectors, which will require case by case assessments, the issue of sustainability must be taken into account, alongside mutual interest and the solidity of transnational relations. If a genuine

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interest is there, in fact, relationships will continue and grow, becoming more and more engaging and stimulating. However, if the interest of the parties is related only to the realisation of a “project” in response to a public funding opportunity, regardless of its future sustainability, there are serious chances that the relationship will end together with the end of financial support.

**The need to be open**

49. These considerations come with no real final conclusions. This paper presents some thoughts and invites to further discuss and share them. In our view, there is a need for farsighted vision that understands how our world is moving, how we can seize the numerous opportunities on offer, which route we should take to tear down walls and barriers before others tear them down with other methods and goals. Peaceful coexistence, we believe, can only be realised by looking far ahead, mutually understanding each other’s reasoning, fears, aspirations, “dreams” (which are not the monopoly of the Western world), and problems, including poverty and emigration/immigration. This must happen in a situation of mutual respect, human rights protection, convinced that we need each other in this global interdependence to achieve shared development and growth, greater stability and security and, ultimately, better conditions for peace.

50. One of the aims of this paper was the desire to convey our conviction, as development cooperation and humanitarian NGOs, that the migration-development nexus has to be considered an enabling factor, a qualifying factor for development, but also much more. This issue is directly connected to the complexity of issues such as poverty, justice, conflict and global governance. The inability on behalf of politics, diplomacy and all of us to grasp and evaluate this complexity in all its positive and negative aspects, pushes us to indefinitely postpone deciding upon necessary and urgent actions that could govern it.